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of the contract of lease. Whether it be for food-vending concessions, as in the present case, or for other purposes, the determination as to whether there is a sublease will also determine
the scope of the lessor's privilege on effects which do not belong
to the principal lessee.
MORTGAGES

A present mortgage may secure future debts, 7 and the socalled "collateral mortgage" may be reissued without the need
for a new recordation. Since the mortgage's effectiveness
against third persons is fixed by the date of recordation, it
was considered that the original date of recordation continued
to be the effective date of the collateral mortgage regardless
of the number and actual dates of reissuances. The harshness
of this result, with reference to other mortgages which were
recorded against the property prior to the reissuance of the collateral mortgage, was alleviated by the decision in Odom v.
Cherokee Homes, Inc.8 The court held that in competition with
other mortgages, the collateral mortgage ranks from the date
of issuance or reissuance of the note secured by it and not from
the original date of recordation. A very good discussion of this
case and the issues has already appeared in this Review.9

PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION

For acquisitive prescription of either ten years or thirty
years, the basic requirement is possession, and this must be a
possession as owner.' In Journet v. Gerard,2 defendant had been
using a strip of land between his residence property and the
street, but the evidence showed record title in the plaintiff. To
the plaintiff's petitory action, the defendant pleaded acquisitive
7. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3292 (1870).
8. 165 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); writs denied, 246 La. 868, 167
So.2d 677 (1965).
9. Note, 25 LA. L. REv. 789 (1965).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3436, 3500 (1870).
2. 173 So. 2d 263 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).

19661

PRIVATE LAW

prescription. Even though the defendant seemed to have the
exclusive use of this strip of land, the evidence showed that a
servitude of passage had been duly established by the respective
ancestors in title. The defendant's use of this servitude could
not constitute possession as owner, and the plea of prescription
was unfounded.3 The plaintiff was recognized as owner subject
to the servitude of passage.
Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Naquin4 is another case in which
the physical use of a property did not constitute possession as
owner. Pretermitting the factual complications of a large family,
and reducing the problems to the one here essential, the situation was as follows. Several co-heirs had accepted the successions of their parents, and then for fifty years one of these coheirs continued to have the use and enjoyment of the entire property in question. Although one co-owner has the right to use
and occupy the entire property, he is not in possession as owner
of the whole. Such precarious possession 5 can only be transformed into a legal possession as owner by means of some unequivocal notice to the other co-owners of an adverse possession
against them.0 The payment of taxes does not serve this purpose; neither does the co-owners' reference to the property as
identified with the person occupying it. The court did not need
to decide, and refrained from deciding, whether the granting of
mineral leases would constitute sufficient notice to change the
precarious possession of a co-owner into a legal possession as
owner. It should take a completely clear, overt, and unequivocal
act to put co-owners on notice that the one who is occupying the
property intends to start an adverse possession for the purpose
of acquisitive prescription.
LIBERATIVE PRESCRIPTION
Two of the most frequent problems in the application of the
laws of liberative prescription are the classification of the nature
of the cause of action and the fixing of the starting point for
7
the running of the time. In Tripod Boats v. George Engine Co.,
one court of appeal held that an action for damages caused by
3. LA. CIVL CODE
4. 167 So. 2d 434
So. 2d 268 (1964).
5. LA. CrVIL CODE
6. 1d. art. 3489.
7. 170 So. 2d 238

art. 797 (1870).
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1964) ; writ refused, 246 La. 884, 168
arts. 3433, 3446, 3500 (1870).
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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vices and defects in the thing sold is redhibitory in nature8 and
that it prescribes in one year from the date of the sale under
Civil Code article 2534. In Motorola Aviation Electronics, Inc.
v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc.,9 another court of appeal likewise
classified an action for damages due to defective equipment as
redhibitory (rather than breach of warranty), and fixed the
starting point for the running of time from the seller's abandonment of efforts to remedy the defects; the only Civil Code article
cited is 352810 from the plea of the defendant in reconvention.
The comparison of these two opinions leaves something to be
desired, and it is hoped that the Supreme Court will clarify the
matter.
Underlying the classification of the actions and the respective prescriptive periods, there must have been certain policy
objectives which motivated the variety and complexity of the
existing rules. It may be time to consider a different set of much
simpler rules more closely reflecting present needs in present
conditions.
The two questions of classification and commencement of the
proper prescription were both involved in Successions of Webre.11
The Supreme Court held that a demand for collation is subject
to the general ten-year prescription under Civil Code article
3544; and dismissing contentions that it commences upon knowledge of the conveyance or upon the filing of the formal succession proceedings, the court held that this prescription runs from
the death of the person to whose succession collation is to be

made.12
In Gulf Ins. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,5 the action
was for damages resulting from pile-driving operations on adjacent property, and the basis for the action was the sic utere
servitude of Civil Code article 667.14 The defense pleaded the
one-year prescription for tort actions under Civil Code article
3536. The court discussed the misleading question of whether
8. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2520, 2541 (1870).
9. 172 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3536 (1870) : "The following actions are also prescribed by one year:
"That for injurious words, whether verbal or written, and that for damages
caused by animals, or resulting from offenses or quasi offenses. .. "
11. 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965), noted in 25 LA. L. REV. 983 (1965).
12. For fuller discussion of the issues, see Note, 25 LA. L. REV. 983 (1965).
13. 170 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964); noted in 26 LA. L. REV. 409
(1966).
14. See also this symposium, under "Property."
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the action was ex delicto or ex contractu, concluding that it was
the former and therefore prescribed. Actually, it is neither, but
rather an action for violation of a property limitation imposed
by law; 15 and in the absence of any express prescription for
actions in damages resulting from violation of legal servitudes,
the general ten-year prescription for personal actions should
apply. 16
In recent years, there have been several cases involving liberative prescription against actions for medical negligence and
malpractice. Doctors and dentists carry, or should carry, liability
insurance, so that some of these suits are direct actions against
the insurer. The reported cases do not disclose the reasons for
the delays in instituting suit; it can be surmised that sometimes
a patient hopes for complete recovery despite the mistake, or
that a compensatory treatment was being tried, or that the
patient was too sick or too worried about other incidents of his
illness to obtain timely legal advice. Procrastinations by the doctor (without such acknowledgment as would interrupt prescription) could also account for the excessive delay in bringing
action. In any event, the one-year prescription, as for a tort,
is unreasonably short. The accuracy and propriety of classifying
such actions as ex delicto have been questioned and discussed
7
before.1
In the case of Springerv. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,'" a suit for
damages resulting from alleged negligence of a physician was
instituted against the doctor's insurer. The court classified this
as a tort action and dismissed it on the ground of the one-year
liberative prescription of Civil Code article 3536. The starting
point for the commencement of this prescription was placed at
the date on which the patient acquired knowledge of the doctor's
alleged negligence. The court's opinion finishes with this state15. In a later decision by different judges of the same court (4th Circuit),
it was stated that "a cause of action under [Civil Code article] 667 is neither
ex delicto nor ex contractu, but is a form of strict liability placed in the Civil
Code under the chapter of servitudes imposed by law." Klein v. Department of
Highways, 175 So. 2d 454, 457 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965). At the same time, the
court held that the Highway Department could not be held liable because the
action under Article 667 "for the purposes of R.S. 48:22 is more analogous to an
action ex delicto" (id. at 458).
16. For fuller discussion, see Note, 26 LA. L. REV. 409 (1966).
17. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 TermPrescription,24 LA. L. REV. 210, 213 (1964) ; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Terrm - Prescription, 25 LA. L. REV. 352, 356
(1965).
18. 169 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1964).
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ment: "Therefore, we are compelled to reach the inevitable conclusion . . ."
This language reflects a reluctance to enforce
this hardship or to create the social injustice of imposing on the
patient a financial responsibility that was intended for the insurer - the lex dura lex sed lex impotence of the court to render
a different decision that would be more in keeping with current
concepts of social justice.
It is submitted that this inevitability is not necessarily so.
In the first place, it is neither necessary nor correct to classify
as ex delicto all actions which claim damages or which allege
negligence. The noble but weak effort to alleviate the hardship
by distinguishing the physician's "non-performance" (ex contractu) from his "unskillful performance" (ex delicto) is neither
20
sound nor convincing nor very helpful.
Secondly, it is not necessary to fix the starting point for the
running of this prescription at the date of acquiring knowledge
of the alleged negligence. This again carries out the analogy to
actions ex delicto, but the two situations are not the same. In
the case of a tort, the wrongful and harmful action occurs either
at once or is a continuing activity of the same sort. In a malpractice case, it is not necessarily known at the time of the
wrongful act, nor at the time of the patient's acquiring knowledge thereof, whether permanent damage will result or not. In
the present case, as would generally be true, the doctor and his
consultant specialists undertook to remedy the harm, and it was
some time before it was definite that a disability would remain.
According to the court's decision, prescription was running anyway. A different and a more realistic approach for fixing the
starting point for liberative prescription was taken by a different court during this same term, where it was held that prescription commenced at the abandonment of efforts to remedy
21
the defect.
Finally, it is resubmitted that "it would be more in accord
with what appears to be the intent of the codifiers to subject
them both [doctor and patient] to the three-year prescription
19. Id. at 173.
20. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term Prescription,25 LA. L. REV. 352, 356 (1965).
21. Motorola Aviation Electronics, Inc. v. Louisiana Aircraft, Inc., 172 So. 2d
118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1965).
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of Article 3538 ' '22 for all actions arising out of the doctor-patient
relationship. This might need a decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court, but it does not need legislation. For the additional
reasons of social justice and uniformity, this is strongly recommended.
Another illustration of the unsatisfactory status of our law
on the problem of classification is seen in the case of Devillier v.
First Nat. Funeral Homes, Inc.2 During a funeral, the casket
was dropped and the body was mutilated; suit by the family
survivors was dismissed on the basis of the one-year prescription
applied to actions ex delicto. The only Louisiana authority cited
is the recent case of Phelps v. Donaldson,24 from which the court
quoted an excerpt of a prior case to the effect that the failure
to perform the duties imposed by law in certain relationships
may be a tort, while the basic relationship was created by contract.
It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court's affirmance in the Phelps case pretermitted this argument and is based
on the ground that the orthodontist's contract in that case did
not "warrant" any particular result; in the latter event, the applicable prescription would have been ten years. In the present
Devillier case, the contract with the funeral home is described
as warranting a decent burial, and the propriety of the Phelps
case as reference is therefore questionable.
Furthermore, and apart from the warranty distinction, there
is still an uneasy feeling about the initial problem of classification as between actions ex contractu and ex delicto. The underlying social policies of liberative prescription should be faced
and determined more deliberately and clearly, as has already
25
been suggested.
In Soirez v. Great American Ins. Co., 26 a direct action was
brought by the wife against her husband's liability insurer for
injuries received as an automobile guest. Although the wife
could not sue her husband, the cause of action against the in22. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term Prescription,24 LA. L. REV. 210, 21.3-14 (1965).
23. 164 So. 2d 597 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
24. 142 So. 2d 585, 587 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), affirmed, 243 La. 1118, 150
So. 2d 35 (1963).
25. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1962-1963 Term Prescription,24 LA. L. REv. 210, 214 (1964).

26. 168 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
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surer was classified as a tort and the one-year prescription was
applied. It was pointed out that while the wife had a cause of
action against her husband, she did not have a right of action
against him; however, since this inability to sue her husband
did not obstruct her right to sue the insurer, there was nothing
to interfere with the running of prescription against this claim.
A keenly debated issue was presented in National Sur. Corp.
v. StandardAcc. Ins. Co. 27 as to whether a suit by the employer's
compensation insurer against the alleged third party tortfeasor
also interrupted the prescription with respect to the claim of
the injured employee. The court of appeal held that there was
no interruption because the nature and extent of the employee's
demand was quite different from the insurer's claim, so that
the defendant in a suit on the latter claim could not be deemed
thereby to have been notified of the former. In reversing, the
Supreme Court maintained that both demands affected the same
cause of action,2 8 and held that prescription against the employee's claim had been interrupted by the insurer's suit, in
which the employee had intervened. Both positions have substantial merit; from the point of view of social policy, and considering that the one-year prescription is rather short in such
cases, the Supreme Court's ruling comes closer to fulfilling the
social need.

MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
MINERAL

SERVITUDES

Joint Lease Extension
The decision in Armour v. Smith1 sheds further light on the
rules regarding joint lease extension of mineral servitude interests. Plaintiff's vendor had created a mineral servitude in favor
of himself by reservation in 1939. In 1946, plaintiff and her
vendor entered into a lease on a standard printed form for a
27. 247 La. 905, 175 So. 2d 263 (1965), reversing 168 So. 2d 858 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1964).
28. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 247 La. 122, 170 So. 2d 347 (1964).

